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THE LONG SHORTLIST: WOMEN CONSIDERED FOR THE
SUPREME COURT
Michael Conklin*
“Oft a bridesmaid—never a bride”
-Susie Sharp, on being considered for the Supreme Court
INTRODUCTION
This is a review of the book Shortlisted: Women in the Shadows
of the Supreme Court.1 While much has been written about the four
women who were ultimately selected to serve as Supreme Court
justices, this book provides insight into the many women who were
shortlisted but ultimately not appointed to the Court. This surprisingly
dates back to 1924, when evidence suggests that President Calvin
Coolidge shortlisted Florence Allen.2 While the book is highly
recommended, this review mainly focuses on areas of critique,
including misleading statistics, the perpetuation of harmful
stereotypes, and accusations of “tokenism.”
OBJECTIVE QUALIFICATIONS
There are numerous factors that presidents consider when
evaluating whom to appoint to the Supreme Court. These include
political affiliation, geography, race, health, experience, academic
pedigree, religion, and judicial philosophy.3 Because of the subjectivity
inherent in such a decision, it is difficult to make a compelling case
that, in the eyes of a particular presidential administration, any one
candidate was objectively more qualified than another. Therefore, it is
difficult to substantiate a claim that a candidate was unfairly denied
appointment to the Court. Regardless, the authors make such claims
throughout the book.
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When discussing the first shortlisted woman, Florence Allen, the
authors heavily intimate that it was her gender that kept her off the
Court.4 While Allen certainly “met the basic political, professional, and
representational standards for Supreme Court selection,”5 that does
not mean it was per se discriminatory that she was not appointed, as
many candidates met the basic minimum qualifications.6 It is certainly
possible that a similarly situated man with the same qualifications
would have been appointed, and therefore Allen was discriminated
against, but there is not enough evidence and far too many unknown
variables to be able to substantiate such a claim.
MISTREATMENT & DOUBLE STANDARDS
The book provides numerous examples of sexist treatment and
double standards that the female shortlisted candidates have faced.
Although never explicitly pointed out, it is interesting to note how this
treatment evolved over the last 100 years. It is also interesting to note
how much of the treatment does not necessarily come from a place of
intentional subjugation or vitriol. To the contrary, some of the sexist
treatment comes from people who likely had the best of intentions in
mind. For example, in a misguided attempt at a compliment, Florence
Allen was told that she had a “masculine mind.”7 This serves as a
much-needed warning that just because someone’s intentions are good,
that does not mean their actions are beneficial.
Of course, not all of the sexist behavior these pioneering women
faced could be considered well-intentioned. A district judge commented
that shortlisted candidate Burnita Matthews “would be a good judge
[except for] just one thing wrong: she’s a woman.”8 President Nixon
commented, “I don’t think a woman should be in any government job
whatever. I mean, I really don’t. The reason why I do is mainly because
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they are erratic. And emotional.”9 Shortlisted candidate Mildred Lillie
had a law professor who refused to call her anything but “mister.”10
These patently sexist attitudes were also well documented in judicial
opinions. This is demonstrated in an 1873 Supreme Court concurrence
that denied women admittance to the Illinois Bar: “Man is, or should
be, woman’s protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity
and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for
many of the occupations of civil life.”11
The authors point out interesting double standards as to how
females considered for the Court are described compared to their male
counterparts. These examples are simultaneously disheartening in
their unfairness and humorous in their absurdity. It is not surprising
that female candidates are more likely to be described by their looks.
Mildred Lillie was complimented for maintaining “a bathing beauty
figure.”12 When shortlisted candidate Susie Sharp made partner, the
newspaper explained that the law office is where “she would use her
brain, unless she decided to pursue marriage instead, where she would
use her beauty.”13 Shortlisted candidate Pamela Rymer was described
as “very elegant and always perfectly coiffed . . . .”14 The New York Post
thought it necessary to describe how shortlisted candidate Soia
Mentschikoff wore expensive hats and “expensive undies of sheer,
black silk.”15
Other observations regarding candidates for the Supreme Court
that are relegated to females include focusing on stereotypical
feminine attributes. Media coverage of Ruth Bader Ginsburg included
her inability to cook a tuna fish casserole.16 And shortlisted candidate
Harriet Miers was said to engage in “a lot of girl talk.”17
Susie Sharp provided a clever reply when questioned as to the
appropriateness of her presiding over a rape trial. She noted that
“since the rape in question could not have been committed without the
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presence of a woman, it was only fitting that a woman oversee a trial
involving this kind of gendered crime.”18
Harriet Miers’s experience as American Bar Association president was
downplayed even though Justice Powell’s experience in this same
position was lauded.19 President Obama was criticized for touting the
“empathy” of Sonia Sotomayor.20 But President George H. W. Bush
received no such criticism when championing the “great empathy” of
Clarence Thomas.21
The authors also provide excellent examples of what they refer
to as a “double bind.”22 This is defined as “situations in which options
are reduced to a very few and all of them expose one to penalty,
censure or deprivation.”23 For example, Florence Allen was given the
following, cryptic advice: “[A female judge] must not assume the
attitude of a man, either in dress or manner of speech. But she must
try her cases in a manly fashion, by which I mean simply be
thoroughly prepared and capable.”24
Double standards and sexist remarks are of course not the only
hardships documented in the book. Many of the shortlisted women
even faced logistical hurdles. For example, Suzie Sharp recounts how
she had to walk through the men’s restroom to enter the court’s
chambers.25
PERPETUATION OF STEREOTYPES
Unfortunately, the book comes dangerously close to
perpetuating harmful gendered stereotypes. This is due to somewhat of
a Catch-22 the authors face. Namely, if the judicial reasoning of a
female is indistinguishable from that of a male, then why is it so
important to place women on the Court? Conversely, if the presumed
gender differences between male and female justices is justification for
more women on the court, then these inherent differences surely come
up in other areas, where they also warrant gendered consideration.
Simply put, advancing the notion that men and women think
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differently is dangerous, as it in turn could perpetuate other gendered
stereotypes that cause great harm.
It is certainly true that, on average, women have had different
life experiences than men. The authors provide the example of Safford
Unified School District v. Redding,26 which involved a thirteen-year-old
girl who was strip-searched.27 It is noted that “none of the men on the
bench know what it is like to be a thirteen-year-old girl.”28 While true,
this point is of limited value, as the justices frequently decide cases
involving situations that they have limited personal experience with.
For example, Supreme Court justices also have little to no experience
with being on death row, being an undocumented worker, being
physically or mentally handicapped, being the victim of police
brutality, being a police officer, being the victim of an illegal search,
having their speech censored, being homeless, or being an LGBTQ
person. Regardless, they routinely render judgments in such cases.
Supreme Court justices may analyze social science research, trial court
transcripts, and amicus briefs to better understand such experiences.
The notion that personal familiarity with a subject results in
superior adjudications in cases involving that subject is never
supported with any evidence in the book and is somewhat
counterintuitive. Our legal system generally recognizes that a judge’s
personal familiarity with a subject results in worse, not better,
judgements on the matter.29 That is why, for example, a judge whose
black, teenage daughter was killed by a white supremacist would be
expected to recuse himself in a case involving a white supremacist who
killed a black, teenage girl.30
QUESTIONABLE STATISTICS
At times, the authors’ use of statistics ranges from misleading to
blatantly false. An example of the latter is found in the excerpt “At the
end of [Reagan’s] two terms, only four of seventy-eight vacancies on
federal appellate courts were filled by women, less than one percent.”31
26
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The authors point out that “only” 7% of President George H. W.
Bush’s judicial appointees were black or Hispanic 32 and deem this a
“lackluster record.”33 This is a deceptive statistic because it ignores
how many Republican black and Hispanic lawyers with the requisite
experience existed at the time. Considering statistics on black and
Hispanic law school graduation rates and voting records provides a
rough estimate of how many qualified Republican black and Hispanic
people were available for President Bush to appoint. Assuming that
blacks and Hispanics made up less than 5% of lawyers with over ten
years of experience at the time,34 and assuming that roughly 17% of
black and Hispanic lawyers were Republican,35 this results in only
0.85% of the candidates available for selection by President Bush being
either black or Hispanic. With this understanding, the “only” 7% that
he appointed is more than 700% greater than what would be expected
based on a race-neutral selection. It is also interesting to note that
President Bush’s record of appointing black and Hispanic justices is
greater than every president that came before him except only one,
President Carter.36
President Bush’s 7% figure could serve as an illustrative
example of the necessity for affirmative action in law school
admissions and discrimination protection at law firms, policies that
may lead to more qualified minorities for consideration, but, as
demonstrated, it is counterproductive in trying to demonstrate a
“lackluster record” in appointing federal judges.
President Bush’s predecessor, President Clinton, also receives a
peculiar critique in the book. He is chastised for merely “checking the
woman box” with his “one token female Supreme Court
nominee . . . .”37 The authors accuse him of being “not willing to
actually select more than one woman for the Court.”38 This appears to
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be misguided criticism, as Clinton only made two Supreme Court
appointments.39
ACCUSATIONS OF TOKENISM
Likely the most troubling aspect of the book is the numerous
accusations of tokenism. The authors claim that “all of the women
profiled in this book were tokens in various ways.”40 To clarify, the
authors are not just documenting accusations of tokenism that the
women had to endure; they are making the claim that, in multiple
ways, every woman considered for the Court was a token.41 Accusing
Ruth Bader Ginsburg as being merely a “token”42 Supreme Court
justice is not only unsupported by the facts but threatens her
credibility by implying she was not qualified for the position.
CONCLUSION
While this review focuses on areas of critique, the book is overall
informative and engaging. It provides insight into people and
situations that are mostly overlooked and, in doing so, gives the reader
a better understanding of the unique challenges females in the legal
profession face.
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